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REREADING ROMANTICISM,  
REREADING EXPRESSIVISM: 
REVISING “VOICE” THROUGH 
WORDSWORTH’S PREFACES
Hannah J . Rule
University of South Carolina
To take up the idea of critical expressivism is to insist upon complexity, con-
tradiction, revision, and expansion, rather than reduction, dismissal, and sim-
plification. Being critically expressivist too then involves a stance toward how 
we shape disciplinary histories. Current-traditional, expressivist, social construc-
tionist—these are meant to signal broad and sure shifts in the foundations of 
writing pedagogy and disciplinarity. While these camps might render a telos or 
progress narrative, they at the same time inevitably diminish practice and con-
cepts. There is imprecision in monolithic terms—expressivism, social construc-
tionism, the personal, the social, romanticism—because, as Peter Elbow writes 
in this volume, these broad terms conceal their multiplicity. Equally unproduc-
tive, the terms are often wielded as weapons, as instruments of reduction and 
dismissal. As this essay works to point out, pedagogies and rhetorics are deemed 
untenable because they are labeled romantic or expressivist, or romantic-expres-
sivist. This essay works to complicate these alliances. 
Over time, composition scholars have found both resonance and dissonance 
with romanticism. While some have found romantic influence a reason to dis-
miss certain practices or pedagogies, still others have drawn upon the romantic 
period to invigorate our conceptions of expressivism. Finding the British ro-
mantic period a productive historical site, in this essay I suggest that nuance can 
be brought to understanding how expressivism, through romanticism, might 
understand language as “personal.” Through the canonical text on language in 
the Romantic period, Wordsworth’s Prefaces to Lyrical Ballads and theories of 
language circulating in the romantic period, I offer a means of seeing roman-
tic—and by extension, expressive—language and expression in a novel way. Es-
tablishing connections between Wordsworth’s Prefaces and the work of Peter 
Elbow make it possible to understand that language emanates not from the radi-
cally isolated individual (as the most familiar cultural understandings of roman-
ticism would have it), but from immersion in the physical world. Understanding 
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romantic-expressivist language in this way illuminates under-theorized aspects 
of language in the expressivist tradition, including the role of the physical body 
in writing, as well as the role of sense experience, presence, and physical location. 
Most significantly perhaps, this rereading complicates the field’s often obses-
sive disavowals of the idea of voice in writing. Finally, this reimagined roman-
tic conception of language brings productive complication to the most familiar 
and over-simplified divides between expressivism and constructionism, a goal of 
many contributors in this volume. 
READING ROMANTICISM FOR COMPOSITION STUDIES
Since its disciplinary beginnings, composition studies has forged curious links 
to romanticism. Linda Flower, for example, in her textbook Problem-Solving 
Strategies for Writers, defines her problem-solving view of writing in opposition 
to what she deems a particularly romantic version of invention. The romantic 
model of writing, exemplified by Coleridge’s “Kubla Kahn,” she suggests, posits 
writing as effortless, mysterious, and as the domain of genius. Wanting to em-
phasize “learnability,” Flower defines her rational, problem solving approach as 
the only reasonable alternative to Coleridge’s (and by extension, romanticism’s) 
seeming creative mysticism, its “myth of inspiration” (Flower, 1989, p.41). Ac-
cepting Coleridge’s conception of writing, after all, would mean the writer isn’t 
able to learn to write at all. For Flower, Coleridge, and romanticism more broad-
ly, is big trouble for invention and big trouble for writing instruction.
Tethered to familiar romantic cultural tropes of original genius, mysticism, 
and inspiration, Coleridge, and more generally familiar “romantic” conceptions 
of writing, have become sites against which some compositionists have defined 
our disciplinary pursuits. Among the most familiar of these voices include Rich-
ard E. Young, who works to separate rhetoric’s pursuits from a particularly res-
onant word on theories of Romantic invention, vitalism. “Vitalist assumptions, 
inherited from the Romantics,” Young matter-of-factly states, 
with [their] stress on the natural powers of the mind and 
the uniqueness of the creative act, leads to a repudiation of 
the possibility of teaching the composing process, hence the 
tendency of current-traditional rhetoric to become a critical 
study of the products of composing and an art of editing. 
Vitalist assumptions become most apparent when we consider 
what is excluded from the present discipline that had earlier 
been included, the most obvious and significant exclusion 
being the art of invention. (2009, p. 398) 
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Vitalist influence for Young is then simultaneously romantic and detrimen-
tal to rhetoric’s pursuits. Both Flower and Young offer shorthand conceptions 
of romantic ideas that they assume endure in culture, influencing writing stu-
dents and teachers of writing. Moreover, they define this romantic influence 
antithetically to the pursuits of composition studies. From this viewpoint, to 
purport pedagogies or rhetorics inflected with romantic assumptions is to be 
backward—as Young says, romantic-vitalist assumptions put focus on products 
and take us back to the debunked, product-centered days of current-tradition-
alism. Indeed, as Hawk points out, composition scholars have most often used 
romanticism as “a category … in the discipline for identifying and excluding 
particular rhetorical practices” (Hawk, 2007, p. 1). Quickly naming a concept 
in composition studies “romantic” has then, on one hand, become shorthand in 
composition studies for dismissal and obsoletism. 
On the other hand, though, and often working to problematize these 
quick links, many compositionists have conversely found the romantic peri-
od a fruitful site for contextualizing and expanding some of our disciplinary 
concerns. Berlin, Hawk, Fishman and McCarthy, and Gradin, to name a few, 
bring complexity and dimension to the relationship between composition and 
romanticism primarily through close readings of primary romantic texts and 
figures. James Berlin, for example, in “The Rhetoric of Romanticism” questions 
the grounds on which Young and others have made “Romanticism—and, by 
implication Coleridge—responsible for the erosion of rhetoric as a discipline” 
(1980, p. 62). Berlin close reads the primary texts of Coleridge to arrive at the 
conclusion that “many of the objections made to Coleridge’s view of rhetoric 
would be rendered nugatory if those making them would realize that Coleridge 
does not demean rhetorical activity in favor of the poetic” (1980, p. 72). The 
close reading of primary romantic texts and figures reveals productive insights 
on the nuance of Coleridge’s considerations of rhetoric and poetic. Byron Hawk 
performs similar, sustained close readings in order to understand differently the 
traditionally romantic concept of vitalism. Though he includes Coleridge on the 
way, Hawk reworks romantic influence by contextualizing vitalism in a history 
much longer than just the romantic period, extending it toward complexity the-
ory (2007, p. 259). His book complicates the often-easy ways romanticism gets 
linked to composition. The result of these “closer looks” at romantic texts and 
ideas is a more nuanced understanding romantic writers and cultural ideals and 
an invigorated concept in composition. For Hawk, a more nuanced conception 
of vitalism opens space for him to reimagine pedagogy that fits “our current 
electronic context and the complex ecologies in which students write and think 
and situates these practices within a contemporary vitalist paradigm of com-
plexity” (2007, p. 10). While there has been a habit of using romanticism to 
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undermine certain schools of composition thought, romanticism can be equally 
generative, bringing new light to pervasive questions or conventional composi-
tion wisdoms. In the broadest sense, in this essay, I continue this productive act 
of looking back to romanticism to question the tacit ways in which expressivism 
has been tenuously linked to certain thin versions of romanticism. 
Like vitalism, expressivism has garnered strong connections between com-
position and romanticism; naming expressivism “romantic,” scholars have at-
tempted to make it out of time, untenable, and passé. Lester Faigley, for exam-
ple, implicitly weaves expressivism with romanticism in “Competing Theories 
of Process: A Critique and a Proposal.” Faigley describes expressivism exclusively 
in romantic terms: expressivist and romantic figures become advocates of the 
other, such that romantic figures somehow anticipate and embody tenets of ex-
pressivist pedagogy. Faigley narrates these implicit connections by first naming 
Rohman and Wlecke “instigators of a ‘neo-Romantic’ view of process;” Peter El-
bow is described as subscribing to the romantic theory “that ‘good’ writing does 
not follow the rules but reflects the processes of creative imagination” (1986, p. 
530). And paradigmatic romantic figures make arguments about expressivism: 
“at times Wordsworth and to a lesser extent Coleridge seem to argue that expres-
sivism precludes all intentionality” (1986, p. 530). In this way, Faigley’s descrip-
tion of expressivist rhetoric doesn’t argue for its romantic inflections, but makes 
this connection implicit. In his later work (Faigley, 1992) questions expressivism 
especially on its theorization of subjectivity,1 finding it out of sync with the reign 
of postmodern subjectivity which, like other social constructivist-leaning com-
positionists, pushes him toward seeing language as shared social material rather 
than the domain of the individual. Here, yoking expressivism to romanticism 
ultimately becomes, as it did for Flower and Young, a means of undermining 
expressivist rhetorics. 
Faigley finds the romantic-expressivist notion of selfhood problematic and 
ultimately finds ground for favoring social constructionist formulations of self 
and language. As Chris Burnham writes, “Faigley argues that expressivism’s ro-
mantic view of the self is philosophically and politically retrograde, making it in-
effectual in postmodern times. Further, expressivism’s concern with the individ-
ual and authentic voice directs students away from social and political problems 
in the material world” (2001, p. 28). Burnham encapsulates how expressivism is 
most often defined against social constructionism. Expressivism, this broad jux-
taposition tends to go, constructs a coherent self with a radically unique voice, 
while constructionism recognizes fragmented subjectivity and the sociality of 
language. 
The link of expressivism to romanticism is, I suggest, in part from where 
this oversimplified binary emanates. Theories of language and selfhood tend to 
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sharply divide constructionism from expressivism on the basis of expressivism’s 
implicit links to versions of romantic theories of language and expression. Ber-
lin—in spite of the nuanced way he understands romanticism and rhetoric—il-
lustrates these connections; Gradin notes that Berlin is “almost single-handedly 
responsible” (1995, p. 2) for the divisions observed in contemporary rhetorics 
of expressivism, social constructionism, and cognitivism. As Berlin categorizes 
rhetorics and their histories in Rhetoric and Reality, he first links “expressionist 
rhetoric” emergent in the era of progressive education with “Brahminical ro-
manticism” (1987, p. 73), a rhetoric devoted uniquely to the individual. From 
this perspective, in romantic-expressionistic rhetorics “the writer is trying to 
express—the content of knowledge—is the product of a private and personal 
vision that cannot be expressed in normal, everyday language” (1987, p. 74). In 
this description, romanticism, expressivism, and the idea of private language are 
consolidated. Later in his history Berlin writes that expressionistic rhetoric, or 
what he calls the “subjective rhetoric” of the 1960s and 70s,” held the 
conviction that reality is a personal and private construct. For 
the expressionist, truth is always discovered within, through 
an internal glimpse, an examination of the private inner 
world. In this view the material world is only lifeless matter. 
The social world is even more suspect because it attempts to 
coerce individuals into engaging in thoughtless conformity. 
(1987, p. 145) 
Berlin again emphasizes that in expressivist rhetorics, language and expres-
sion are thought to emanate from within the individual. Expression is deemed to 
be radically individual, unique and avoiding (or ignoring) influence from both 
the material and, by extension, social world. Berlin, ultimately an advocate of 
social constructionism, is quick then to explain how this inward-turned para-
digm “denies the place of intersubjective, social processes in shaping language” 
(1987, p. 146). Put more plainly, social constructionists accuse expressivism of 
understanding language as individual, a private language that is supposed to be 
true and radically unique. Social constructionists, by contrast, see language as 
the province of the social group and thus there can be no purely personal truth 
or unique expression. 
Taken together, Faigley and Berlin are constructionists who define them-
selves against expressivism on the issue of from “where” language emanates. 
Patricia Bizzell too echoes this distinction when she discusses the difference be-
tween outer and inner directed theorists: 
one theoretical camp sees writing as primarily inner-directed, 
and so is interested more in the structure of language-learning 
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and thinking processes in their earliest state, prior to social 
influence. The other main theoretical camp sees writing as pri-
marily outer-directed, and so is more interested in the social 
processes whereby language-learning and thinking capacities 
are shaped and used in particular communities. (1992, p. 77) 
Associating expressivism with romanticism enhances this divide. In the next sec-
tion, I reread romanticism to complicate our sense of romantic expression. 
REREADING ROMANTICISM: WORDSWORTH’S PREFACES 
TO LYRICAL BALLADS
This essay argues that romanticism can be an illuminating historical period 
for composition studies, laden as it is with theories of creativity, language, and 
subjectivity. In particular, as some compositionists have already demonstrated, 
taking a closer look at romantic texts complicates the dichotomy between ex-
pressivism and social constructionism. Steve Fishman, for example, aligns the 
writings of Elbow and German Romantic philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, 
suggesting ultimately that “it was the social reform dimension of German ro-
manticism that inspired expressivism” (1992, p. 647). This revised lineage pro-
vides a means of understanding expressivism’s relation to the social. Fishman 
suggests that Herder and Elbow “stress the integration of personal life and public 
expression,” understand expression as “the start of our dialogue with others,” and 
are “critical of the exclusionary quality of academic discourse” (1992, p. 651). 
Fishman’s comparative reading of Elbow and Herder leads him to understand 
both romanticism as a movement and Elbow as an expressivist figure in a new 
light: neither romanticism nor expressivism should be seen as asocial; instead, 
the emphasis on the individual’s relation to the broader political and social com-
munity. In this way then, Fishman eases the dichotomy between expressivism 
and constructionism, understanding the focus on the personal as implicitly a 
focus on the social. 
So too does Gradin, in her book-length second look at romanticism, seek 
ways to ease the divides between expressivism, feminism, and social construc-
tionism. To accomplish this, like Fishman, Gradin revisits romantic primary 
texts primarily to see within romantic philosophies an investment in the social. 
Unlike Fishman however, she turns to highly visible figures from the English 
tradition, particularly Wordsworth and Coleridge, as she suggests that these fig-
ures “were much more directly influential on American educational thought that 
were the Germans” (Gradin, 1995, p. xvii). Overall, Gradin finds a productive 
thread running from romanticism to expressivism especially in the romantic the-
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ories of imagination (1995, p. 38) and in the ways romantics theorized educa-
tion (“the importance of the individual; the importance of personal experience; 
and an emphasis on activity as opposed to passivity” (1995, p. 36)). Like Gradin, 
I turn back to a familiar romantic, William Wordsworth, but with a different 
goal. In theories of language from the period and from the pinnacle statement 
on language in the period, Wordsworth’s Preface(s) and Appendix to Lyrical 
Ballads, I question the easy assumption that romantic-expressivist language is 
thought to emanate from the interior of the unique, isolated individual. Instead, 
the Prefaces suggest that language and meaning is found in of the sensuous world 
of physical experience. Following Fishman and Berlin’s reading of Coleridge, 
depth and insight can come from careful micro-focused reading. 
In order to glean from Wordsworth’s Prefaces a novel way of understanding 
romantic expression, it’s helpful to contextualize his work in conversations about 
language’s origins popular in this period. In the eighteenth century, language 
became a philosophical “problem.” Inquiries into the nature and the origin of 
language, including the relationship of physical, worldly things to language, ac-
cumulated. According to Hans Aarsleff, “language study” in this period “even 
when called philology,” was not merely a matter of knowing the forms, syntax, 
phonology, historical relationships, and other aspects of particular languages. It 
involved questions of wider significance. What, for instance, was the origin of 
thought? Did the mind have a material basis? Did mankind have a single origin? 
(1967, p. 4). Considerations of language in the romantic period were also an 
opportunity to consider mind, thought, being, and knowledge. In these theo-
ries, many hypothesized a physical, embodied basis for language in early human 
interactions and interactions with the physical environment.2 This broad sense 
that language has physical and material bases, provides the central premise of 
the work of Horne Tooke, the most important and popular language theorist 
in the period, to advance what would become a popular (Aarsleff, 1967, p. 73), 
provoking, lightning-rod text.
Tooke’s Diversions of Purley published first in 1786, reissued in 1798 and 
released with a second volume in 1805 (dates which correspond with Roman-
ticism’s heyday) posits the most simplified version of language which argues 
that both language’s origins and contemporary language systems are based in 
the material world. Completely undermining arbitrariness and fully embracing 
empiricist sensation, Tooke’s “linguistic materialism” (McKusick, 1986, p. 12) 
deploys elaborate etymologies to show how words are immediately the signs 
of material things and concepts or what he calls “abbreviations” of them. Says 
Aarsleff, “Naming is the essence of language as Tooke had shown by tracing all 
words via etymology to the names of sensible objects” (1967, p. 94). Etymolog-
ical analysis shows how parts in words correspond to the way we associate our 
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physical experience with these things in the world; for example, Tooke offers 
“bar” as example meaning “defence,” and then goes on to explain that a ‘barn’ 
is a covered enclosure, a ‘baron,’ a powerful man, ‘barge,’ a strong boat, etc. 
(Tooke, 1847). This simple idea that “all words can be reduced to names of 
sensations” was quite popular and tapped into some of the major concerns of 
the moment. In claiming that language is implicitly connected to physical expe-
rience in the world, Tooke’s pervasive and popular thoughts on language carried 
many implications for romantic thought. One such implication is language’s 
relationship to education. If language is out there in the material world, and not 
the domain of mind and education, rationality is dislodged from its centrality in 
matters of thinking and speaking. Olivia Smith helps articulate this implication 
for education as she states, “if sensation and feeling are the basis of vocabulary 
and all modes of thought, then experience and perception become reputable 
forms of knowledge and can no longer be described as essentially different from 
rationality and abstraction” (1984, p. 213). 
Taking up the popular interest in language, Wordsworth’s famous poetic ex-
periment, Lyrical Ballads, with its explanatory prefaces and appendix, founds 
Romanticism as a movement. As is commonly remembered, recited in fact, 
Wordsworth’s Advertisement to the 1798 Lyrical Ballads describes the poetry 
collection as an experiment as to “how far the language of conversation in the 
middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure.” 
And thus, language becomes central, but not so central, to Romanticism as a 
literary movement. I say, “not-so” as an acknowledgement to the fact that while 
language is the experiment so touted, it is not what is often considered “revolu-
tionary” about this text. Rather in more conventional readings of Romanticism, 
feeling seems to overshadow language’s sensuousness. However, especially in 
light of Tooke’s theory—published and republished as it was just before Word-
sworth’s first publication of Lyrical Ballads in 1798—Wordsworth’s Prefaces par-
ticipate in the origin of language debates by arguing that expression suited to 
poetry should be saturated not with the unique emanations of the genius poet, 
as is often thought, but instead this expression should reveal the physical, inhab-
ited world of the speaker. 
One place to see Hooke’s theory of language reflected is in Wordsworth’s ar-
ticulation of his experiment in the 1802 preface. Here Wordsworth shifts the 
terms of his language revolution to “a selection of the real language of men in a 
state of vivid sensation” and “a selection of language really used by men” (Preface 
to 1802). I want to here really lean on that new phrase “vivid sensation” and link 
it to Tooke’s theory of language. Wordsworth advocates for language that emerges 
in relation to physical, material, natural encounters. Rather than language being 
abstract, poetical language should emerge from context, sensation, and feeling. 
209
Rereading Romanticism, Rereading Expressivism
Moreover, as Gradin’s work details, Wordsworth had particular liberatory ideas 
about education and the social classes. For his poetic experiment, he focuses on 
“low and rustic life” as the subject and speakers of many of his poems. Word-
sworth focuses on the lives of the “rustics” as a poetic ideal because, he writes, 
“in that condition, the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which 
they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and speak a plainer more 
emphatic language” and because “such men hourly communicate with the best 
objects from which the best part of language is originally derived” (Preface to 
1802). Like Tooke, Wordsworth believes that expression should not be trained, 
rational, and abstract; which is to say in another way that poetry should no lon-
ger follow neoclassical rules. Instead, expression should emerge from lived ex-
perience; facility with language and expression comes best from those who can 
“hourly communicate” with the physical world. 
The Appendix to the 1802 Lyrical Ballads too dramatizes Wordsworth’s the-
ory of romantic expression. To begin, Wordsworth thinks back to the origins of 
poetry first stating, “The earliest Poets of all nations generally wrote from passion 
excited by real events; they wrote naturally, and as men” (Appendix to 1802). By 
contrast, he sees in his immediate predecessors the mechanization of poetic lan-
guage. These poets produce language without the influence of sense experience: 
desirous of producing the same effect, without having the 
same animating passion, set themselves to a mechanical 
adoption of those figures of speech, and made use of them, 
sometimes with propriety, but much more frequently applied 
them to feelings and ideas with which they had no natural 
connection whatsoever. A language was thus insensibly pro-
duced, differing materially from the real language of men in 
any situation. (Appendix to 1802.)
Wordsworth’s poetic experiment is in this way a critique of poetic expression 
that fails to rely on physical sensation and physical experience with the world. 
He wants poets to express language having a “natural connection” to one’s real, 
lived experience in the world. He is against “a language … thus insensibly pro-
duced” (Appendix to 1802), against language that’s hollow and abstracted. This 
phrase—“insensibly produced” language—echoes Tooke’s theory of language. 
Wordsworth aligns with Tooke by understanding language as emergent from the 
world of experience, sense, and feeling. Wordsworth’s “rustics,” close to nature 
and “hourly communicat[ing] with the best objects from which the best part 
of language originally derived” (Preface to 1802) become the expressive ideal. 
This theory of romantic language and expression, as shaped by close readings 
of Wordsworth and Tooke, sees words as fundamentally “out there,” accessed 
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through physiological sensation and feeling. Rather than assuming that romantic 
expression as isolated and inward-looking, this second look at the most canoni-
cal of Wordsworth’s thinking shows instead that expressive-romantic expression 
looks decidedly outwardly, toward first-person, embodied, sense experience, as if 
writers were “standing in a landscape of language” (Smith, 1984, p. 215).
REREADING EXPRESSIVISM: ANOTHER LENS FOR “VOICE” 
IN WRITING 
By taking this second look at romantic theories of language, the “expres-
sion” in expressivism can look substantially different. By expanding on the tacit 
link that Berlin and others have made between expressivism and romanticism 
through close reading of a canonical romantic text, some of Berlin’s foundation-
al and lasting assertions about expressivism denying the social and valuing the 
inwardness of unique expression could be challenged. For one, this rereading 
of Wordsworth goes some distance in undoing certainty about the supposed 
inwardness of language in romantic philosophies. It is useful also to cut through 
these binary impulses more directly by applying Wordsworth’s romantic theory 
of language directly to a still percolating debate about the idea of voice in writ-
ing. I want to expand the possibilities for understanding language and voice, and 
ultimately then, expand our senses of the “expressivist tradition.” 
There are few more vexed concepts in composition, and in expressivism more 
specifically, than voice. Linked to this concept are debates about subjectivity and 
selfhood, structures of power, and theories of language. Most stable about this 
concept seems to be its unrelenting persistence and imprecision. As Peter Elbow 
writes in Voice in Writing Again: Embracing Contraries, critiques of voice “seem 
valid, yet voice stays alive, even in the most “naïve” forms that have been the 
most powerfully critiqued” (2007, p. 3). Darcie Bowden, among the most vocif-
erous critics of the voice metaphor, echoes this ambivalence: “the permutations 
and varying conceptions of voice, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, make 
voice difficult to completely support or to completely reject as a useful metaphor 
for textual analysis or for pedagogy” (1999, p. vii). Voice has become a key site 
for debate in liberatory, feminist, expressivist, and multicultural rhetorics, as 
“voice is a pivotal metaphor in composition and rhetoric studies [as it] focuses 
attention on authorship, on identity, on narrative, and on power” (Bowden, 
1999, p. viii). While voice in general endures as a concept, there are nonetheless 
voices in the field that, like Faigley, understand voice as matter-of-factly unten-
able in our current postmodernist, poststructuralist framework. Mimi Orner, for 
example, scrutinizes the idea of voice in liberatory education rhetorics, claiming 
plainly that “calls for ‘authentic student voice’ contain realist and essentialist 
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epistemological positions regarding subjectivity which are neither acknowledged 
specifically nor developed theoretically” (1992, p. 75). Voice, under this critique, 
implies stable identity and personal language. Writes Orner, “discourses on stu-
dent voice are premised on the assumption of a fully conscious, fully speaking, 
‘unique, fixed, and coherent’ self ” (Orner, 1992, p. 79). Bowden, on similar the-
oretical grounds, argues that voice has lived past its usefulness as her whole book 
rests on the “assumption that that there can be no such thing as voice, that it was 
a metaphor of particular historical moment, and that that moment has passed” 
(1999, p. viii). The idea of voice in writing becomes most vigorously critiqued 
when voice is said to reveal a unique individual and when language is thought to 
reveal the self, each accusations leveled at expressivist voice in general. 
Keeping Wordsworth’s desire for expression to be saturated with experience 
in mind, we can understand Peter Elbow’s concern with voice as a concern with 
physical reality and experience; that is, voice in Elbow and more broadly across 
expressivist thinking, can be understood not as transcendent personal truth or 
unique expression, but instead as alive, embodied language that sounds like a 
real human person is speaking. Using Wordsworth’s romantic theory of language 
as a backdrop highlights Elbow’s concern with the physical body, the spoken 
voice, and attention to contexts for speaking. 
To begin seeing this physical nuance in expressivist voice, I look back to El-
bow’s 1968 essay “A Method for Teaching Writing.” This essay describes Elbow’s 
experience helping conscientious objectors writing petitions to avoid the draft. 
Much of how Elbow talks about voice and expression in this essay is echoed in 
how Wordsworth talks about poetic language in his Prefaces. Central to this essay 
is Elbow’s concern for writing that is “alive” (1968, p. 122). Evidence of life in 
written language is, for Elbow, “when words carry the sound of a person” (1968, 
p. 122). Like Wordsworth, then, Elbow emphasizes the importance of language 
sounding true to one’s lived experience, the words uttered in the experienced 
world—or as Wordsworth might say, the “real language of men in any situation” 
(Appendix to 1802). Moreover, Elbow explicitly values language connected to 
experience, explaining that “everyone does have a ‘word-hoard’: a collection of 
words that are connected to his strong and primary experiences in the world—
as opposed to words which (putting it inexactly) are only connected to other 
words” (1968, p. 120). With a focus on language relating to physical experience 
in the material world, Elbow here cites Vygotsky’s Thought and Language on the 
difference between spontaneous and scientific concepts. Just as Elbow briefly 
explains, spontaneous or “everyday” concepts “are the meanings of words of ev-
eryday language, which a child uses in everyday life/interaction, while scientific 
concepts are the ones the child masters during systematic instruction of basic 
knowledge” (Temina-Kingsolver, 2008). Implicit then in Elbow’s suggestion of 
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writer’s “word-hoards” is the idea that language has an explicit connection to 
worldly experience, aligning with the romantic-expressivist conception of lan-
guage as having a material, physical basis. 
There is much made about how expressivism falsely supposes that one can 
access through language a transcendent self or personal truth. Mimi Orner, writ-
ing on voice in liberatory rhetorics, argues that “calls for student voice in edu-
cation presume students, voices, and identities to be singular, unchanging and 
unaffected by the context in which the speaking occurs” (1992, p. 80). In “A 
Method for Teaching Writing,” an essay that could be categorized under libera-
tory rhetorics, Elbow moves away from this side of the voice concept, explaining 
again more of a concern with physical bodies in the real world. Elbow writes: 
but I am not talking about intimate, autobiographical 
“self-exposure” when I talk of “revealing a self in words.” Writ-
ing in words which “reveal the self ” has nothing necessarily 
to do with exposing intimacies—undressing. For I am talking 
about the sound or feel of a believable person simply in the 
fabric of the words … the most impersonal reasoning—in 
lean, laconic, “unrevealing” prose—can nevertheless be alive 
and infused with the presence of a person or a self. (1968, p. 
123) 
Elbow here is very clear that he’s not interested in personal truths or confessions, 
but with getting words on the page that are saturated with experience, words 
that come out of the body, not ones conceived of in a purely intellectual way, not 
from that tissue of words only connected to other words. 
There is certainly more to say about Elbow’s takes on voice across his work 
but in this 1968 essay it becomes very clear that voice has fundamentally to do 
with the body and sense experience. But this embodied basis for voice is some-
what under-theorized in Elbow’s own considerations and the more general ways 
voice circulates as a concept in our field. In his most recent, extensive consider-
ation of physical voice too, Vernacular Eloquence, Elbow only seems to narrowly 
suggest that his interest in the speaking voice and the natural pacing of intona-
tion units has something to do with the body and with language being connect-
ed to the physical world. Sounding a lot like Wordsworth in the Prefaces, Elbow’s 
mission in the book is to shift the paradigm of literate culture: “our culture of 
literacy functions as though it were a plot against the spoken voice, the human 
body, vernacular language, and those without privilege” (2012, p. 7). But only 
in one section does Elbow attempt to consider the implications of embodiment 
theory. Occasionally, he will make mention of the embodied nature of language, 
such as, “our longest and usually deepest experience of how words carry meaning 
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involves felt bodily experience, not just intellectual understanding” (2012, p. 
252). Beyond this though, the voice in expressivism has remained mostly dis-
embodied. Putting new focus on romantic primary texts reveals a way to under-
stand romantic expression as experiential and physical. Rereading romanticism 
in this way helps us disrupt the sticky sense that expressivism is about radically 
unique self-expression and even that language is the domain of each individual. 
Rather, another version of romantic expressivist version of voice only really asks 
that writer’s “put their body where their words are” (Elbow, 2012, p. 253). 
Elbow has tirelessly reexamined voice in his own thinking, as well as in the 
thinking of his critics. This view of voice as seen above encapsulates Elbow’s 
most recent emphasis on voice as spoken, lived, and embodied. And this em-
bodied dimension of voice seems to be something Bowden can agree with El-
bow on. Bowden takes a whole chapter of her book to “detach the literal voice 
from the metaphorical one” (1999, p. 82) and demonstrate the usefulness of 
this to reading practices: “the only useful application of voice may stem from 
an understanding of how the literal voice operates in reading” (Bowden, 1999, 
p. 83). Bowden’s chapter in support of literal voice has her sounding very much 
like Elbow in her recommendations to enlist the spoken voice for interpretation 
and revision. Bowden writes: “reading aloud helps writers and readers tap into 
their aural imaging, and understand at a visceral level the rhythms, contours, 
and tones of a written text” (1999, p. 97). Amidst the restless ground of voice 
then, Bowden, Elbow, and Wordsworth find a common ground in the idea that 
written expression has a basis in the embodied and physical voice.
A rereading of romanticism highlights a way of conceptualizing voice and 
language in the expressivist tradition in a way that emphasizes its physicality, 
rather than its inwardness. This in turn complicates the easy ways expressiv-
ism is divided from social constructionism. Romantic theories of language value 
first-person experience, but experiential and sense experience instead of unique-
ness or transcendence. Moreover, looking back to romanticism provides another, 
under-theorized way of considering language that can also disrupt the expressiv-
ism/constructionism binary. 
The romantics conceived of language and meaning as fundamentally em-
bodied and material. Wordsworth and Tooke’s romantic theories of language 
create an under-theorized connection from romanticism to composition. This 
emphasis can be linked to current work in composition. For example, Sondra 
Perl’s conception of felt sense would be a site at which language is understood as 
a physical act. Working from the philosophies of Eugene Gendlin, Perl’s concep-
tion of felt sense “calls attention to what is just on the edge of our thinking but 
not yet articulated in words” (2004, p. xiii), a view that there is meaning, located 
in the body, prior to and informing of language. Perl suggests “that language and 
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meaning are connected to inchoate, bodily intuitions” (2004, p. xvii). Perl ends 
up nodding to an expressivist tradition here too, positing the physical body as 
a site of fresh and “true” expression. Tapping into felt sense in this way echoes 
expressivist practice in which the body’s “natural” rhythms might resonate with 
lived experience. This embodied view of language is further elaborated in the 
work of Lakoff and Johnson. Metaphors We Live By kicks off their exploration 
of the embodied foundations of language, demonstrating that metaphors ar-
en’t specialized language but have implicit physical dimensions. Johnson, in his 
book The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, writes “an 
embodied view of meaning looks for the origins and structures of meaning in 
the organic activities of embodied creatures in interaction with their changing 
environments” (2007, p. 11). Much more than a cognitive engagement with 
language, Johnson suggests, “meaning reaches deep down into our corporeal 
encounter with our environment” (2007, p. 25). Johnson here echoes Word-
sworth’s concern for “hourly communicating” with the physical world. If we see 
language as having a physical basis, the product of embodied human beings in-
habiting a material world, how might we understand voice, expression, identity, 
and authorship differently? 
CONCLUSION: REVISING THE DIVIDES
If composition studies can be neatly divided into camps, paradigms, and 
pedagogies, there certainly will be some generalizing that doesn’t hold true in all 
cases. Expressivism, a historical time period and a set of informing orientations, 
certainly takes its fair share of overgeneralizing. As a complement to these broad 
disciplinary stories, we also engage in work on the micro-level, calling into ques-
tion the way these broad camps divide us. As Hawk says, “counter-histories can 
always be drawn, and new groupings of texts, events, and practices can always 
be articulated. The goal of such a historiography is not simply to arrive at a 
more accurate image of the past but to create a particular affect in the present” 
(Hawk, 2007, p. 11). Looking back to romantic theories of language brings an-
other more complex dimension to voice, expression, and the mythos of personal 
language that often sticks to conceptions of expressivism. While the broadest 
strokes tend to come from critics of expressivism, this revisionary move can even 
shift the grounds that expressivist advocates may stake for it. Chris Burnham for 
example describes “expressivism’s strength” as “its insistence that all concerns, 
whether individual, social, or political, must originate in personal experience and 
be documented in the student’s own language” (Burnham, 2001, p. 31). This 
is a familiar refrain about expressivism. But in the context of Wordsworth, how 
we understand “personal experience” and the “student’s own language”—some 
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of the most essential ways we have to talk generally about what expressivism 
is—is different. Personal experience, then, is not necessarily personal writing or 
self-expression, but writing infused with physical experience out in the world—
first person experience, in other words, that doesn’t lead necessarily to one’s own 
singular language. Rather than seeing expressivist language as personal, unique, 
and transcendent, romantic texts make available a way of seeing language and 
expression as having fundamentally a material and embodied basis. 
If language can be conceived as neither the domain of the individual or 
purely the social group, then some of the deepest divisions between construc-
tionism and expressivism are eased. Especially as constructionism has branched 
off in our current moment to a focus on networks, location, situatedness, and 
material systems in ecological, post-process, and spatial theories, a revised sense 
of romantic-expressive language as material and embodied draws attention to a 
writer’s always shifting physical location and relation with the world. 
NOTES
1. In Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition, Faigley 
“questions the existence of a rational, coherent self and the ability of the self to have 
privileged insight into its own process” (1992, p. 111).
2. Three essayists who considered the origins of language were Thomas Reid, Lord 
Monboddo, and Condillac. Thomas Reid thought that in language there are ar-
tificial as well as natural signs, and “particularly that the thoughts purposes, and 
dispositions of the mind have their natural signs in the face, the modulation of the 
voice, and motion and attitude of the body” (McKusick, 1986, p. 11) and without 
this natural meaning located in the body, “language could never have been estab-
lished among men” (McKusick, 1986, p. 11). For Lord Monboddo, the process of 
language learning should begin with the natural, embodied signs and meanings and 
“only by means of them can the learner become oriented within the much larger 
class of conventional signs” (McKusick, 1986, p. 12). Condillac, by contrast, pushes 
the origins of language out in to the physical world. These thinkers’ explanations 
of language’s relationship to sense experience demonstrate the pervasiveness of this 
embodied, experiential view in the romantic period. 
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